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Abstract 
Most research into the early telephone system has focused on telephone providers rather 
than users, and this article begins to address that imbalance. The telephone was initially 
used to improve internal communications within firms, by connecting offices with 
warehouses, or by enabling staff working away from the office to report back. With the 
expansion of exchange networks, the commercial, intermediary and brokering sectors 
became heavy users of the technology for routine information transfer within business 
districts. Business elites continued to favour face-to-face contact for strategic business 
negotiations, however, and delegated telephone use to their employees. 
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The volume of research into the early telephone is now considerable, but it remains 
geographically and thematically limited. Most of the literature relates to the United States 
or Canada, and most focuses on the producer side of the industry, with the telephone 
companies being investigated as providers of systems and networks, and as early adopters 
of large-scale corporate managerial structures. Few historians have written, even in part, 
on demand and use aspects of the telephone in the nineteenth century. 
This article begins to address these gaps by assessing business use of the telephone 
in Britain during the three decades between the introduction of the technology in the late 
1870s and nationalisation of the network in 1911. The first section has a brief survey of 
the existing literature and an overview of the development of the early British telephone 
system. It also considers the fundamental question of rates and charging structures, which 
had far-reaching implications both for the growth of the network and for the adoption and 
use of the telephone by firms. The remaining sections consider the use of the telephone 
by business, paying particular attention to the related questions of where telephonic 
communication stood in relation to the boundaries of the firm, and what effect the 
technology had on the roles of owners, managers and employees in business offices. 
  
 
I 
 
The business history of the early telephone is dominated by the telephone companies 
themselves. Much of the literature consists of institutional, strategic and managerial 
histories, many drawing on the formidable archives of the American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. (AT&T); these resources have inspired several volumes of work on the 
constituents of the Bell system and its role in the development of the industry in North 
America.
1
 Even when not focusing directly on the telephone companies, however, 
historians in a variety of fields have still concentrated on the producer/provider side of 
the industry. Historians of technology have written about instruments, wires and 
switchboards, all of which posed scientific and technical challenges, as well as political 
and administrative problems when attempting to integrate wires with existing urban 
infrastructure.
2
 Students of labour, ethnicity and gender have focused on the new 
occupations that emerged from the early telephone system, especially the telephonist.
3
 
Historical geographers and economic historians have made innovative use of expanding 
telephone networks to assess information flows, urbanisation patterns, competition and 
regulation.
4
 Work on the early British telephone network has followed the lead of most 
contemporary commentators, with much emphasis on institutional rigidities and the 
planning blight caused by extended debates over nationalisation and licensing in the 
1880s and 1890s; inevitably, this too tends to focus on provider rather than user 
perspectives.
5
  
The volume of work published on the user side of the industry is much smaller, and 
again, North American material dominates. The once-widespread farm networks in the 
United States have been described as „a consumer-driven diffusion, perhaps even a social 
movement‟, in a rare study that makes some attempt to balance evidence from users and 
providers alike.
6
 In addition, the social uses of the telephone, initially discounted by the 
telephone companies, became an important element in expansion of the system the 1920s, 
after early decades of largely business use.
7
 Three studies (two North American, one 
British) have assessed adoption patterns in urban areas, demonstrating in valuable detail 
the competing dynamics that drove business and social diffusion of the technology in the 
early years.
8
 Overall, though, there is a dearth of published research into the adoption of 
telephones by business, and the incorporation of the technology into business practice 
and office management: this, despite the growing awareness that the late nineteenth 
century office was the scene of considerable innovation in filing, copying and other 
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information-handling processes.
9
 Little work has been done on the implications of the 
telephone for the internal organisation of the firm, or the communications patterns of 
firms, networks and business districts. We know least of all about actual telephone use, as 
opposed to telephone adoption—as will be seen, the day-to-day use of the technology in 
offices varied widely from firm to firm, even within the same sector.  
Before considering business use of the telephone, a brief survey of the system‟s 
early development will be useful. Telephones competed with a number of entrenched 
communications systems—the mail, the telegraph, and urban messenger services—and 
for technical and revenue reasons required locational critical mass to justify investment in 
wiring, poles and exchange buildings. The technological feasibility of services beyond a 
short distance was initially uncertain, and the first systems were installed in Britain by 
private telephone companies at their own risk, rather than being coordinated and 
subsidised by the Post Office. Business and professional use in compact urban districts 
offered the best hope of a concentrated user population willing to pay relatively high 
charges for the new technology. In Glasgow, for example, the first exchange was aimed 
at connecting physicians, pharmacists and hospitals; this was followed quickly by 
exchanges for stockbrokers, lawyers, and business in general, before the entire system 
was interconnected into one network.
10
 There were of course many more businesses than 
doctors and lawyers in British cities, so business rapidly overtook professional use, but 
the early recruitment of professionals was considered „a first class piece of 
salesmanship‟.11 
By the late 1890s, critics argued that this local, uncoordinated strategy, while 
successful in building a system without public subsidy, had held back British telephone 
adoption in relation to that of competitor nations. In the words of the 1898 Parliamentary 
Committee set up to investigate the system, the service remained limited 
 
in the United Kingdom chiefly to England, in England to urban districts, in urban 
districts to the commercial classes, among the commercial classes mainly to 
merchants and large tradesmen, and among them to those only who find it 
advantageous to become subscribers.
12
 
 
Telephone companies initially targeted business districts in London and in the 
commercial and industrial centres of the north of England and the central belt of 
Scotland, and then exploited rapidly-improving technology to make these cities regional 
exchanges for compact networks of local and trunk lines within about a thirty-mile range. 
Thus the Northern District Telephone Co. connected the shipping, coal and steel complex 
of the North East coast between Newcastle and Middlesbrough; the National Telephone 
Co. built a line from Glasgow to Edinburgh, and expanded outward into the Forth and 
Clyde industrial belt; and the Lancashire & Cheshire Telephonic Co.‟s zone around 
Liverpool was connected with other clusters through Manchester to Leeds and Sheffield, 
building a network that was appreciably more dense than those in other parts of the 
country. In 1889, the Lancashire & Cheshire and the National joined with London‟s 
United Telephone Co. to form a reconstituted National Telephone Co., and the NTC 
became Britain‟s dominant telephone provider until the network was transferred to the 
Post Office in 1911.
13
  
The broad industrial zone of the north of England was the most densely developed 
part of the NTC network, with higher rates of calls per line than in London (table 1). The 
trans-Pennine corridor is prominent in the table, as is lowland Scotland, the Potteries 
(Hanley) and the North East. It is possible that London firms were earlier adopters of 
multiple lines, which would have served to lower the average overall, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that there was a real difference in usage: in 1895, the NTC President 
testified that the „telephone in London has not become so essential a part of the 
commercial machinery as in Liverpool, or Manchester, or Leeds‟.14 Most likely, the 
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London figures are affected by the sheer variety of businesses working in the capital, and 
by a disproportionate number of less-used telephones in private houses and government 
offices.   
 International comparisons suggest that Britain was appreciably slower to adopt the 
telephone than the United States and some European countries, most notably Sweden, 
and critics blamed existing competitor technologies, institutional rigidities and high 
charges for this relative backwardness.
15
 The telegraph system, a Post Office monopoly 
run with a heavy public subsidy, was a formidable competitor over long distances, and 
reductions in telegraph rates—including one in 1883 just as the telephone network was 
beginning to expand—enabled the Post Office to maintain its hold on longer-distance 
messaging.
16
 Short-distance telegraphy, however, was badly hit by the telephone, 
contributing further to the already poor financial performance of the telegraph.
17
 The Post 
Office therefore used its powers to limit the telephone companies‟ operating licences, and 
took over the long-distance lines in the 1890s, denying the NTC the opportunity to build 
a truly integrated national network. It also targeted particular elements of the system that 
seemed to threaten the telegraph, for example in restricting the installation of „call 
offices‟ in public places for the use of non-subscribers; these therefore developed much 
more slowly than in other countries, most notably in the United States, where the 
drugstore telephone became ubiquitous.
18
 At local level, some municipalities refused to 
allow telephone companies to lay underground cables, resulting in unreliable services: 
Glasgow was the most extreme case.
19
  
Telephone charges had important consequences for the development of the 
network, and for the differential adoption rates evident between various categories of 
user. High up-front subscription models excluded most of the population from having a 
domestic telephone in many countries, and the Canadian record on this point has been 
interpreted as an ideological opposition by capital to the diffusion of telecommunications 
among the working classes.
20
 In Britain, too, the NTC President claimed in 1895 that he 
did „not think any working man, not one in a hundred thousand, would ever use the 
telephone‟, and rejected the suggestion that this was due to its cost; he argued that small 
tradesmen and shopkeepers were a possible market, however, and would be the subject of 
a concerted campaign to persuade them of the system‟s benefits.21    
The charging regime continued to be problematic. Until 1907, British telephone 
providers operated a flat-rate subscription model, with no additional call charges for local 
calls, although long-distance calls carried a separate charge for each three-minute call. 
The subscription varied from company to company and over time; £20 was a common 
annual figure in the early 1880s, with a complicated tariff for extra lines and instruments, 
but subscriptions had fallen to £10-15 by the 1890s. From 1907, new subscribers were 
given a „measured‟ rate, which consisted of a lower subscription (£5-6), an allowance of 
between 360 and 500 calls, and a call rate for any additional calls (again, there were local 
variations). Many existing subscribers were allowed to retain the legacy flat rate, 
however, and the pricing regime remained confused and regressive. The charging regime 
was not reformed again until the 1920s, when a Parliamentary committee recommended a 
„message‟ rate, based on a charge for each call as „the only strictly equitable basis of 
charging for telephone service‟.22  
In its first generation, therefore, adoption and use of the telephone in Britain has to 
be assessed within the flat rate environment, which set a relatively high entry-threshold 
and favoured large users of the telephone. Critics argued that a „wealthy minority‟ had 
paid „a subscription in many cases disproportionate to the assistance the telephone 
exchange system has been to their business‟, and was denying access to the system not 
just to a broader public, but to large sections of business and industry below the elite.
23
 
Subscriptions also had to be paid annually in advance, which was believed to be a 
considerable deterrent to smaller users.
24
 Large firms, such critics argued, were restricting 
their own businesses in the longer term, but such arguments meant little to business 
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services firms that had no need to deal with a broader public, and whose immediate circle 
of contacts already had the telephone.
25
 In 1898, one Glasgow merchant who dealt 
primarily with wholesalers believed that all his contacts could afford the current system, 
and that broadening access would only overload the network further.
26
 
Early telephone providers used flat rates mainly for administrative convenience, 
but became disturbed by the moral hazard of a system that encouraged large users to 
make great use of the network to the exclusion of others. Herbert Laws Webb, a 
prominent telephone engineer and commentator, equated flat rates with undercapitalised 
equipment and indifferent service, all characteristic of the initial „experimental period‟ of 
telephone development that the United States, but not Europe, managed to outgrow in the 
1890s.
27
 The Canadian writer Herbert Casson observed that the flat rate system had 
proved satisfactory for small towns and farming regions, but that „in a great city such a 
plan grew to be suicidal‟.28 Following the example of some American exchange 
districts—Buffalo, NY, most notably—local NTC officials attempted to introduce a 
measured rate in Sheffield in 1892, but met fierce resistance from large users of the 
telephone who benefited from the flat rate. One firm complained that it would be charged 
£95 a year under the proposed measured rate, as opposed to £10 under the flat rate. Some 
smaller users also opposed the change, arguing that they preferred a predictable flat rate 
rather than a variable rate even if the latter was cheaper.
29
  
This response from the lesser users among the Sheffield business classes seems to 
lend support to Lipartito‟s point that widespread (and continuing) customer preference 
for bundled rates can appear irrational and may reflect broader cultural differences.
30
 
However, it is unclear  from the Sheffield evidence how much of a premium firms were 
willing to pay for the convenience and predictability of flat rates, or, indeed, whether the 
flat rate was more expensive at all. The difference between the proposed rates in 
Sheffield in 1892 was only £3; at 1d. per extra call over an initial 1,000, any firm making 
six calls per working day would have been better off with the flat rate. Had the flat rate 
been £50 instead of £10—still a fraction of the telephone‟s worth to the larger users—
lesser users would presumably have supported the measured or even the message rate. 
The differentials between rates, and their implications for user choices, need to be 
analysed in more detail before conclusions can be drawn about wider cultural preferences 
for bundled or itemised charging regimes in the British case. 
Early British flat rates were undoubtedly too high for most domestic users, but 
were hardly onerous to many businesses. Some of the firms that cited cost as a reason for 
not subscribing seem far from marginal. One Glasgow commission agent argued that he 
would benefit greatly from the telephone, and would subscribe at a rate of £5, but could 
not justify the £10 charge; he had 400 open accounts with retailers across the city and 
frequent communication with those customers and with commercial travellers. A lawyer, 
who also wanted to pay no more than £5, employed two clerks and an office boy, so the 
telephone, even at £10, would have been a small expense in relation to his wage bill 
alone.
31
 Firms in the shipping industry that made heavy use of trunk and local lines alike 
already paid large sums for the telephone. James Gardner & Co. and George Gibson & 
Co., Glasgow shipbroking firms that shared the same managing clerk, spent £340 a year 
on telephone subscriptions and trunk call charges in the 1890s, and believed they got 
value for money.
32
 
The overall picture, therefore, is of a technology that was quickly adopted by 
business, but with continuing uncertainty over technological capabilities, charging 
regimes and the political and administrative environment. Adoption, however, is much 
easier to assess than use: what exactly the telephone was used for, and its effect on office 
practice and business culture, remains much less clear. The flat rate system meant that the 
telephone companies kept no systematic evidence for the calls made by their customers 
that would facilitate the reconstruction of call patterns in any detail. Equally, firms had no 
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reason to log their use of the telephone. Even in the long-distance system, which did 
charge individual calls, little firm-level evidence survives.  
These questions must be approached by seeking less direct evidence, and this 
article draws heavily on testimony given to Parliamentary enquiries into the telephone 
service during the 1890s. These were convened against a background of sustained 
criticism of the NTC lasting for more than a decade, both from users and from some city 
councils that wanted to create their own municipal networks. In addition, there was 
widespread disquiet about the eventual intentions of the Post Office, given that the NTC‟s 
licenses were due to expire in 1911, and that extended planning blight seemed 
characteristic of the industry. In such a charged political atmosphere, much of the 
evidence given to Parliament, and that appearing in the letters columns of newspapers, 
has to be viewed with caution. For the purposes of this article, however, many witnesses 
incidentally offered unique testimony of their day-by-day use of the telephone, and it is 
that element that underpins much of the argument in the following sections. 
 
 
II 
 
As with most business communications technologies, the telephone raised questions 
about the boundaries of the firm and about the management of internal and external 
information flows. The telephone was initially marketed as a means of improving 
communications within the firm, and this remains an important function. The 
development of exchange technology enabled communications between firms, but also 
added a new dimension to internal company systems, because owners and managers 
could call the office and give direct orders from anywhere on the network.  
At the very beginning, while exchange systems remained experimental and 
geographically limited, direct private-wire connections were the mainstay of the 
telephone companies‟ marketing efforts. Firms operating on large or dispersed sites could 
improve their internal links with telephones, as could businesses that were in the transport 
and communications field themselves. In the 1840s and 1850s, the railways had famously 
adopted the telegraph as a natural complement to their own network, and telephones in 
turn were attractive to the transport sector. Tramway, cab and omnibus companies in 
larger cities linked stables and local depots to one another, and to a central office for 
administration and, eventually, for taking bookings from the public. One Glasgow cab 
firm reckoned it used 200 miles of telephone wire across the city in 1894. It called all its 
offices every morning at 8am to ensure that the lines were working (and, presumably, to 
check that staff were at work).
33
 Dock estates were among the largest sites under a single 
management in the later nineteenth century. The Clyde Navigation Trust had telephones 
in all of its dock facilities on both sides of the river, at its building and maintenance 
works (7 miles away at Dalmuir near Clydebank), and in its offices at Robertson Street in 
Glasgow.
34
 
Private point-to-point wires connected offices to warehouses, and offices to homes. 
In Liverpool, the Daily Post connected its office in Lord Street to the home of its editor, 
half a mile away in Bedford Street North. Across the river, Birkenhead entrepreneur John 
Laird installed a line from his home in Hamilton Square to his iron works.
35
 From the 
very beginning of the telephone era, promoters saw home-to-office connections as an 
important selling point for the wealthier business classes, especially those living in more 
distant suburbs:  
 
The merchant sitting in his house at Chiselhurst or at Harrow can, with telephonic 
communication between his study or his bedroom and his City office, receive full 
reports of the day‟s business as often as occasion may arise…To a busy man, the 
possibility of remaining away from town without neglecting his affairs is a 
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valuable consideration. Elderly men wishing to take life more easily may be 
consoled that the time is at hand when indispensable mental exertion will be 
unattended by the necessity for excessive physical effort.
36
 
 
After exchange systems became widespread, firms often acquired an exchange 
connection at their office, but maintained private wires to branches and works. Table 2 
collates the numbers of instruments and the type of lines used by a selection of Glasgow 
firms: this evidence emerges incidentally from testimony to the 1898 enquiry into the 
city‟s telephones, and includes firms that explicitly stated the nature of their telephone 
connections. Although the adoption rates of exchange lines can be traced in telephone 
directories, fragments like this are the only surviving record of private wire and internal 
extension usage, and it is clear that private wires remained an important element of the 
telephone system after the spread of exchanges.  
Private-wire systems restricted telephone contact beyond the boundaries of the 
firm, ensuring that branch offices could only communicate with the central office, and, 
obviously, that no one from outside the company could call them directly. It is unclear, 
however, whether this was a deliberate attempt to control information flows, or a by-
product of technical limitations. Some firms installed exchange lines in their branches 
and warehouses when they first became available in the 1880s, but then reverted to 
private wires because they were more reliable. Delays and faults on the exchange system 
meant that firms were embarrassed by not being able to communicate customers‟ orders 
between sites immediately: the customer might struggle to get through to the main office 
in the first place, but at least with private wires the subsequent communication within the 
company concerning that order would be faster.
37
 In a different context, London Stock 
Exchange members had reverted to dedicated private wires to the provinces by 1900, in 
pursuit of reliable service for their huge call-volumes.
38
 
Exchange systems offered a radical shift to communication beyond the boundaries 
of the firm. Still, much use of them remained internal in the administrative sense, 
consisting of managers calling in with orders and employees reporting back to the office. 
The initial idea that businessmen would use telephones to manage their offices from a 
distance remained important, although limited to a select few. In 1895, the NTC surveyed 
348 London subscribers who had both domestic and business lines, and found that the 
leading groups were merchants (80), manufacturers (39), stock brokers (38), newspaper 
staff (21) and solicitors (20): between them, they accounted for more than half of such 
cases, leaving a long tail of lesser traders, retailers and professionals in small numbers. 
Evidently, very few in the latter categories had the resources or inclination to manage 
their firms from a distance.
39
  
 Although initially restricted by Post Office rules designed to protect telegraph 
revenues, telephone companies installed „call offices‟, available either for a charge or to 
existing telephone subscribers on production of a company token, and one of their most 
common uses was in reporting from the field. In commercial cities, the various 
commodity and shipping exchanges were crucial nodes for information transfer: when 
they installed telephones, it would become possible to „have all the advantages of being 
in one‟s own office and on ‟Change at the same time‟, predicted one early enthusiast.40 
Routine information that fed into company decision-making did indeed come to be 
updated many times during trading sessions, and shipbrokers‟ charter clerks, for example, 
called their offices with the latest freight rates being quoted on the Glasgow Exchange.
41
 
Call offices were also in great demand at key transport locations. In Liverpool, call 
offices at the docks earned £50 a year in 1910, against an average of £14; only the 
railway station call offices raised similar revenue.
42
 Telephones brought a dramatic 
improvement in communications on dispersed sites like dock estates. In 1884, 
Liverpool‟s Chamber of Commerce complained that commercial clerks had to spend a 
good deal of time at the docks, and that they were effectively out of touch for long 
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periods: although they could send messengers back to their city-centre offices, this was 
not always a fast or reliable method.
43
 Indeed, the telephone companies targeted the 
alleged inadequacies of messengers in their advertising. Pictured reading newspapers or 
watching ships in the harbour, they featured in leaflets headed „The telephone service is 
the quickest messenger‟.44  
Internal company communications remained a priority even over longer distances. 
A few firms installed their own private wires into the hinterland, such as that stretching 
about 12 miles between the Glasgow offices and Motherwell iron works of David 
Collville & Sons, and used them intensively enough to justify the installation expense.
45
 
Some of the first inter-urban network lines were sold to customers as a means of 
improving communications between branches, extending the quasi-internal role of the 
telephone. The Post Office agent targeted cotton-broking firms with offices in both 
Liverpool and Manchester when attempting to raise enough support for a trunk line 
between the two cities in 1881. At that point, the Lancashire & Cheshire Telephonic Co. 
had six subscribers willing to pay £240 a year for use of the line between the two cities; 
that was equivalent to the cost of employing two or three clerks, so a small minority of 
firms was clearly doing a very large regional telephone business virtually from the 
beginning of the service.
46
  
Commercial centres acted as telephonic focal points, often showing a net „import‟ 
of calls from their adjacent areas. Table 3 summarises statistics collected by the NTC in 
1898.
47
 Newcastle and Sunderland served as office and administrative centres for 
shipbuilding, coal-mining and related industrial clusters, and had particularly high ratios 
of inward to outward junction calls (that is, calls from neighbouring exchange areas: this 
was an intermediate level between local calls and calls on the long-distance trunk 
system). The Liverpool evidence is even more explicit, with the neighbouring exchanges 
of Birkenhead and Bootle having very high „export‟ levels. In addition, the Birkenhead 
and Bootle exchanges handled very few local calls within their own boundaries, 
suggesting that there was little office-to-office communication within those districts: 
most of their traffic was with Liverpool. Birkenhead only had sixty-seven telephone 
subscribers in 1884, but that figure doubled the following year when a telephone cable to 
Liverpool was installed through the Mersey rail tunnel.
48
 The imbalance of inward and 
outward calls suggests that branch offices, employees working away from the office, 
managers living in the suburbs, and firms based in the dock and factory districts were 
more likely to initiate calls to firms in the central business district than vice versa. 
Exchange systems also enabled truly external telephone use, beyond the 
administrative (as well as the physical) boundaries of the firm, but analysis of such usage 
poses major evidential problems. As has been noted, neither the telephone companies nor 
individual firms kept systematic records that enable the reconstruction of telephone use 
patterns, but some illustrative material survives. Table 4 summarises the testimony given 
by firms at the enquiry into the Glasgow telephone service in 1898. This selection of 
business-to-business telephone use provides some evidence of vertical communication, 
with firms tending to call those immediately above or below them in the trading chain. 
Using exchange wires raised the issue of confidentiality, which along with 
reliability problems emerges as one of the main drawbacks of the early networks. One 
common complaint in the 1890s was that exchange operators were cavalier about putting 
calls through: conversations were interrupted and privacy threatened if the third parties 
were also interested in the discussion that was taking place.
49
 This was a particular hazard 
for those working in brokering roles, because they might have to conduct separate 
negotiations with several parties in the course of completing a single deal, and could not 
reveal any of these discussions to any of the others. One Glasgow shipbroker complained 
that he might be fixing a cargo with a shipowner when the merchant in question tried to 
call, and was put on the line as well. He had reverted to sending written offers by 
messenger when confidentiality was particularly important.
50
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The shipping industry—a sector with an obvious need for remote 
communications—offers useful evidence for the telephonic „reach‟ of firms. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, some firms were using telephones to manage coastal trades 
where activity at several stopping points along a route required co-ordination. Aberdeen, 
for example, was a hub for coastal shipping between southern and northern Scotland, and 
firms based there were active users of the longer-distance lines to their branches, agents 
and customers in Leith.
51
 In this sector, the „just-in-time‟ capacities of the telephone 
quickly became indispensable. One Glasgow shipbroker complained in 1897 that he had 
tried to tell his agent at Bowling, ten miles down the Clyde, to stop a vessel from 
proceeding to Glasgow, but had lost the connection; by the time he was able to telegraph 
instead, the vessel had passed, and had to be turned round subsequently.
52
 As ever, 
though, individual firms made individual choices. The London office of Turnbulls, a 
leading Whitby shipping firm, seems to have used the trunk line sparingly, preferring to 
send telegrams; it was more important to them to have a local telephone line to the Baltic 
Exchange, where their coal charters would be settled on a daily basis.
53
  
If patterns of use were widely varied, volumes of use were even more so. The early 
telephone providers saw that the system was developing in a very polarised manner, and 
struggled to balance the demands of different customers: „they knew that large firms were 
telephoning all day, whilst a man in a small way of business made one or two calls per 
day‟.54 Even in 1913, it was calculated that around one third of all subscribers made 
fewer than 500 calls in a year, although by then some of those would have been domestic 
lines.
55
 As will be seen, some business users were already making that number of calls in 
a week during the 1890s.  
In the flat rate era, managers and owners neither knew nor cared how often the 
machine was used in the office.
56
 Even after the introduction of the measured rate for 
some firms in 1907, there is no systematic record of call volumes at the level of 
individual users, although subscribers often complained to the press of apparent errors in 
their bills.
57
 Indirect evidence is available, however. Exchange managers were instructed 
to monitor the largest users of the system, and this informed the telephone companies‟ 
sales strategy: firms with lines that were often engaged were urged to take a second line 
or a switchboard of their own, to ensure that their callers got through. Telephone 
companies sometimes recorded the names of the frustrated callers and passed this 
information to the engaged firms, in order to strengthen their argument about lost 
business, although no lists of firms dealt with this way appear to survive.
58
   
The allegation that some numbers were constantly engaged was among the most 
common complaints about the early systems. Contemporaries found it hard to believe, but 
the largest firms did make and receive so many calls by the late 1890s that their machines 
were always in use. According to the chief operator in Glasgow, the firms of P. & W. 
MacLellan (Clutha Iron Works), the Caledonian Railway Co., the Allan Line (steamship 
owners) and the Clyde Shipping Co. could „very seldom‟ be reached without a lengthy 
wait. The Caledonian Railway Co., which had just one telephone line, made 112 calls 
between 9am and 6pm on what was claimed to be a typical day, at a time when even fifty 
calls was considered heavy use.
59
 Calls were not distributed evenly across the day in 
British commercial centres, and there were peaks around 11am and 3-4pm.
60
 Even 
assuming a uniform distribution, however, the Caledonian made just over one outgoing 
call every five minutes, plus an unspecified number of incoming calls: assuming call-
durations of even two minutes, the telephone would indeed have been constantly in use. 
Other firms had lower phone usage, but evidently spent a disproportionate amount of 
time failing to get through to the large companies with which they did business. One 
Glasgow shipbroker tried to make nineteen calls in twelve minutes, and found nine 
numbers engaged; he stated that it was a busy time and that many of the lines were those 
of large firms.
61
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Firms acquiring more than one line were therefore likely to be heavy users, so 
analysis of firms having multiple numbers in local telephone directories can offer an 
indication of volume of use. By 1906, Liverpool telephone officials reported that 120 
firms had adopted additional numbers, following a campaign by the NTC persuading 
heavy users to increase their capacity.
62
 It is clear from contemporary complaints, 
however, that some firms with only one line were equally heavy users—they were just 
more resistant to paying for additional lines.
63
 In 1920, a Whitehall committee 
investigating the system recommended that the Post Office should refuse service to 
anyone whose engaged calls exceeded 25% of successful incoming calls, and who 
refused to rent an additional line; that was still a considerable proportion and suggests a 
persistent attitude on the part of some businesses.
64
  
The matter is complicated by evidence that some firms neglected incoming calls, 
apparently not believing that failure to handle these might result in lost business. NTC 
staff in Liverpool remonstrated in 1907 with „the Secretary of one of our largest shipping 
firms‟, who was ordering his operator to give preference to internal extension calls. In 
other respects, that firm was well advanced: it had a private switchboard, and employed a 
(female) operator specifically to work it. Nonetheless, it remained „not very solicitous‟ 
about incoming messages.
65
 Other firms tried to use their relative power in the business 
hierarchy to limit the number of incoming calls they received. One Glasgow biscuit-
maker ordered commercial travellers not to contact him by telephone, insisting that they 
come to the office in person.
66
 
The Liverpool section of the 1899 NTC directory lists fifty-two firms with a second 
line for the operator to use if the first was engaged, and this is some reflection of the type 
of firms that were particularly active users.
67
 Classifying these firms by sector reveals a 
preponderance of agents, brokers, wholesalers and various firms in foodstuffs (table 5). 
The same directory also lists thirty-one firms which advertised that they had an extra 
„trunk-only‟ line, perhaps an indicator of heavier use of the long-distance network. The 
great majority of these were in the transport, brokering and intermediary trades (table 6).  
In long distance telephony, a few sectors are well known as early-adopters and 
heavy users, but evidence for its use by other kinds of business is fragmentary. Much of 
the traffic on the lines between London and provincial cities was believed to originate in 
stock exchanges, because stockbrokers found the system‟s capacity for short, immediate 
messaging particularly suited to their information requirements.
68
 Those advocating an 
expansion and liberalisation of the long-distance system often cited stock exchange or 
newspaper use, but tended not to give other examples, perhaps because there were few.
69
 
The Liverpool and Glasgow evidence, however, suggests that some members of the 
shipping trades ought to be added to the list of heavy trunk-line users. It is important to 
stress, however, that for many users, „long-distance‟ may have stretched no further than 
the regional hinterlands of the major commercial centres, with their rapid spread of busy 
inter-urban lines.  
By the end of the second decade of telephone development, therefore, a small 
proportion of firms had moved toward heavy use of the technology for local contacts, and 
an even smaller group had adopted long-distance communications; in both cases, firms in 
intermediary and service roles dominated the lists. Most users, including the great 
majority of firms working in those same trades, were much slower adopters of the 
system. In addition, a significant component in telephone use remained the speeding-up 
of communications within the boundaries of the firm, rather than the exploitation of its 
potential for connecting firms at a distance. 
 
 
 
III 
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What, then, was the impact of the telephone on the office environment and culture of 
Victorian and Edwardian business? There were early fears that the telephone would 
further disrupt patterns of business life that were already under threat from various 
innovations, although some comments sound suspiciously like technophobic caricatures. 
For example, an 1879 editorial in The Times argued that businessmen who had once been 
able to organise their day‟s work after the arrival of the morning post were increasingly 
having to react to incoming telegraph messages, and now telephone calls, at any time.
70
 
Widening access to the telephone, it was feared, would increase the business expenses of 
the elite, who would have to employ more staff to filter calls.
71
  
In fact, businessmen already had gate-keeping strategies to screen callers and 
incoming messages, and they extended these to the telephone. Whether to use the 
telephone personally, or to delegate it to a subordinate, quickly became just another 
element in the reinforcement of office hierarchies. Indeed, with nice irony, the Post 
Office‟s own trunk-line salesman could not get past the outer offices of leading 
Manchester firms to discuss the installation of a line to Liverpool in 1881, and 
presumably did not consider the matter appropriate for discussing over the telephone; the 
private offices of De Jersey & Co. and Reiss Bros, he complained, were as „jealously 
guarded as if they were state prisons‟.72  
There was some disagreement over the effectiveness of telephone gate-keeping. 
One critic complained that he would be in a meeting with a lawyer or broker, who would 
break off from their conversation to talk with another client who had called on the 
telephone.
73
 Some firms apparently either lacked the staff to screen calls, or were 
uncomfortable turning away clients, who had already come to expect instant access to 
their advisors by telephone. This seems to contradict the equally common complaint 
about neglect of incoming calls, although there might have been a difference in attitudes 
between business and the professions on this point. An alternative explanation, however, 
was that such interruptions were deliberate, and represented a clever use of the new 
technology to discourage loquacious clients from lingering in their lawyers‟ offices.74 
If some businessmen saw the telephone as a threat to their time and self-
determination, the telephone companies had little sympathy: „The person who says he 
does not want to be rung up on the telephone, that he does not want to be at the beck and 
call of other people, and so forth, is usually a rather arbitrary person of somewhat old-
fashioned ideas‟.75 Elite resistance was not, of course, incompatible with growing 
telephone use, provided that businessmen could be persuaded to adopt the technology and 
delegate its use to junior staff. In any case, owners and managers show widely varying 
attitudes toward personal use of the telephone.  
There are many examples of senior business figures who made little use of the 
telephone, any more than they would have personally used the telegraph or carried a 
message. The mercantile classes gave great weight to face-to-face discussion, lowering 
the status of other forms of communication by default, and this encouraged the business 
elite to leave telephone use to their employees. „Most of the business men in Glasgow 
give the message to a boy, and don‟t go to the telephone‟, claimed one of their number.76 
A grain merchant, for example, testified that he went to the telephone „as seldom as 
possible‟, leaving it to his staff.77 A Manchester solicitor reported that the telephone in 
his outer office was used constantly, but that his own desk instrument was only needed 
three or four times a day.
78
 That individual was a member of the city council and the Ship 
Canal Company, so should have been part of influential local business and administrative 
networks; such connections were evidently not maintained by telephone at any level of 
detail. Businessmen did use the telephone to make their existing routines work more 
smoothly, by having office boys call to make appointments with their contacts, which 
they then attended in person.
79
 Even in 1911, a visiting American telephone executive 
noted that English businessmen continued to call with „Are you there?…I will be right 
over, I want to speak to you‟.80 
 12 
 Although that anecdote was intended to satirise the quaint practices of English 
business, such practices were rational enough in elite circles where discussions were 
strategic rather than immediately time-sensitive. In sectors where a large volume of short, 
focused discussions took place involving relatively few variables, businessmen show a 
much higher level of personal engagement with the technology. Shipbrokers have already 
been mentioned, and the telephone radically speeded up their fixing of prices, volumes 
and dates, when compared to their previous practice of having to visit shipping and 
mercantile offices, or frequent the Exchange. Men in the  coal trade often worked at the 
boundaries of production, wholesale and retail, with constant shipments and sales to 
handle: one Glasgow coal merchant, who was also a partner in hinterland colliery 
companies, claimed to „have almost lived on the telephone during business hours‟.81  
This question of who actually used the telephone had wide implications. Telephone 
companies argued that many „faults‟ were caused by the failure of office boys to use the 
machinery properly, and some businessmen agreed.
82
 Others argued that the „faults‟ were 
more likely to be caused by the businessmen themselves, being relatively unused to the 
equipment.
83
 The solution was to employ trained, dedicated telephone-answering staff, 
but even large firms resisted this. At the Glasgow Railway Engineering Works, office 
boys, junior clerks, senior clerks and the chief clerk all attended the phone.
84
 The Clyde 
Navigation Trust did employ a commissionaire to work its own switchboard, but that was 
not common practice.
85
 In „thousands of offices‟, claimed one of the NTC‟s Liverpool 
staff in 1907, the office boy had to master the private branch exchange, and in his 
frequent absence on other duties, this task would devolve to the nearest clerk: this 
practical problems added to the issue of incoming calls being handled in a rather random 
manner. That said, only two per cent of calls were not answered at all, suggesting that 
almost all offices developed some system for answering the phone.
86
 
There is also evidence that office workers rapidly adopted the telephone for 
personal use, especially in the era of the flat-rate system. If senior businessmen shunned 
the telephone, their junior employees allegedly embraced it. When, in the early twentieth 
century, measured rates were introduced, many firms were shocked by how many calls 
they were charged for. Herbert Laws Webb argued that „the “telephone habit” has so 
spread to all classes of the community that a large amount of private use of the telephone 
goes on in many business establishments‟. Discussing sport, conducting love-affairs, and 
placing bets had all become traditional, it was alleged, and would not be wiped out in a 
hurry just because each call was now billed.
87
  
As early as 1886, there had been complaints that cricket matches in Manchester 
generated considerable telephone traffic across the North West as office workers called 
their local exchange to get the latest scores, although which rank of worker did this is 
unclear.
88
 Given the scarcity of domestic telephones even at the most elite levels, illicit 
use of the office telephone to contact people working in other offices would have been 
the most common means for the clerical classes to use the technology. The rapidity with 
which lower-status office workers lost access to telephones when call-metering was 
introduced is unclear, but in the longer term the ability to make external calls without 
seeking permission became an indicator of an individual‟s place in the office hierarchy.  
Those working close to, but not at, the top of large companies also seem to have 
adopted the telephone more enthusiastically than the partners and owners themselves. 
Managers, accountants and company secretaries are more visible in the sources 
personally using the technology. Revealingly, though, such people saw routine use of the 
telephone as isolating them from their peers, and they made attempts to encourage face-
to-face meetings. The President of the North East Coast Association of Secretaries (that 
is, Company Secretaries, not clerical workers) told his members that before the 
Association was formed in 1905, they had  
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a mere telephonic acquaintance. They knew each others‟ voices only; their faces 
were unknown to each other, they might transact over the telephone very important 
business…and meet next day in the train as perfect strangers. All that was now 
happily changed. Through their Association they had met and become acquainted, 
he believed, to their mutual benefit.
89
 
 
Company Secretaries were still in the process of becoming a managerial, professional 
group with standards of their own, and would undoubtedly have formed associations in 
any case. Such an explicit statement about the use of the telephone by a senior 
occupational group is rare in this period, however. Raising the status of the group 
required the creation of face-to-face, personal business connections of the sort long-
practiced by their superiors. In the process, the managers sought to distance themselves 
from the routine telephone interactions that made their jobs easier, but which clearly had 
negative implications for their status on the corporate ladder. 
 
 
IV 
 
Many of the issues faced by business in accommodating the telephone were revisited 
repeatedly in the twentieth century as successive new technologies were developed, and 
even some of the most recent are beginning to attract the attention of historians.
90
 Each 
new telecommunications invention tends to be hailed as a global, world-shrinking device, 
but the local orientation of early telephone systems is a useful reminder that many 
adoption decisions are taken in a narrower compass. The widespread early use of the 
telephone for speeding internal company communications reinforces the importance of 
this dimension, as does its gradual (and only gradual) displacement of some existing 
communications techniques and technologies.  
The relative lack of engagement with the telephone on the part of senior 
businessmen is an important example of the persistence of face-to-face networking and 
communications within business culture, especially given recent work on the centrality of 
such information exchange to the functioning of commercial centres.
91
 At the same time, 
many categories of business information were entrusted to the telephone from an early 
date, and the evidence presented in this paper suggests that shipbroking and other 
intermediary firms might be fruitful subjects for research into the effect of 
telecommunications on productivity in the late nineteenth century. A better grasp of the 
complicated patterns of adoption and use of the telephone by British business should lead 
to a more subtle classification and understanding of different kinds of business 
information, and of varying strategies for its exchange and circulation.  
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